Just a few months after Taiwan's presidential election, there were intensive interactions between Taipei and Beijing, including the meetings of Vice President Vincent Siew and KMT Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung with Chinese Communist Party General-Secretary Hu Jintao. Despite these dialogues, however, the two sides should both now adopt an incremental engagement policy--a step-by-step approach that needs to be encouraged with positive responses in order to keep the momentum. Mutual trust may therefore be built incrementally.
Economic ties across the strait have been the most urgent issue for Taiwan's voters and have been the first sign of improvement in bilateral relations since Ma assumed the presidency. Once hailed as a leading "Asian tiger," Taiwan is now falling behind Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea in terms of economic performance. The "normalization" of economic relations between Taiwan and mainland China has been adopted as a core policy by the KMT government with an aim at revitalizing the country's economy.
International participation is the next step the administration has outlined as a priority in talks with Beijing. Ma has repeatedly promoted "diplomatic truce" as the basis for future consensus of both sides on Taiwan's request for more international space. Mainland China should therefore demonstrate responsibility to the world in dealing with the issue of Taiwan's legitimacy in international society. Beijing can initiate an armistice in the competition for the diplomatic recognition of small states in Africa, Latin America and the Asia-Pacific. The World Health Organization and other functional international institutions may also be the platforms for Beijing where it could loosen its objection to Taiwan's participation.
The most difficult part of any Taiwan-mainland China talks is the political arrangement that will unavoidably touch upon issues of sovereignty. Ma has reassured the mainland about Taiwan's good intentions of increasing predictability, such as denunciation of de jure independence for Taiwan. Hu should respond by reducing the military threat against the ROC by announcing a unilateral withdrawal of ballistic missiles targeting the island. Both sides should pledge no use of force against each other and establish confidence-building measures that can lay the foundation for mutual trust and understanding.
New diplomatic strategy
Among its policies, the KMT government's foreign policy has drawn wide attention in Taiwan as well as from international society. The administration's proposed model of mutually beneficial equilibrium, or what has been called "flexible diplomacy," is designed to achieve a dignified, pragmatic, flexible and responsible diplomacy composed of comprehensive dimensions.
While Taiwan's diplomacy has mainly focused on relations with diplomatic allies, the government's new foreign policy covers a wide range of relations. These include conventional bilateral diplomatic relations, close ties with allies like the United States, Japan and the European Union, participation in multilateral international organizations, economic and trade arrangements, and involvement in regional and non-governmental organizations.
Ma's foreign policy has garnered a great deal of attention both domestically and internationally. The president's stated diplomatic truce between Taipei and Beijing refers to a stoppage of offensive moves in competing for diplomatic recognition. It needs to be emphasized that tactics like the diplomatic truce should be aimed at helping reach strategic goals. The diplomatic truce must be an expression of friendliness so as to help build an environment beneficial to regional security. Taiwan must let mainland China and its diplomatic allies see the effort and sincerity it has put into the truce.
However, many question Ma's diplomatic truce policy. Therefore, the core strategic goals of a new foreign policy should be outlined by the administration in order to convince people why the new approach is more sensible than those previously adopted.
Before its foreign policy can be effectively implemented and the diplomatic truce can be widely accepted, the government should answer concerns about its approach expressed at home and abroad. First, the opposition Democratic Progressive Party and some commentators argue that it is strategically wrong since the government has disclosed its bottom-line long before starting to negotiate with Beijing on Taiwan's international participation. There are also suspicions about whether the government has a well-planned "road map" toward the mutual understanding of the ROC's participation in international institutions. While these speculations may be understandable, the initiative of diplomatic truce by Ma can be seen as a good strategy in the sense that the friendly gesture may encourage the other side to respond accordingly.
Taiwan's new approach of a diplomatic truce seems to have been realized. Countries that sought alternative relations were persuaded to stick to the current ties. Ma's official visits to some of the ROC's Latin American allies in mid-August were aimed not only at strengthening the bilateral ties, but allowed him to tell the leaders of those countries that the KMT government has no objections to their establishing economic and cultural relations with mainland China.
Challenges ahead
Since the dialogue between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, represented by Taiwan's Strait Exchange Foundation and mainland China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait respectively, has resumed, it has offered some bright signs of relief as mentioned. Nevertheless, there are problems at home and abroad, waiting to be solved.
The first challenge the ROC faces is on the domestic front. The great divide between the two rival political camps on the island has been a major obstacle to any sensible policy in dealing with mainland China, and as a result, toward any solution to Taiwan's international standing.
What the government has to do to boost its credibility in negotiating with mainland China is to reach across domestic party lines in forming some basic consensuses. With differences over external relations, such as the title and the status for international participation, the KMT government can soothe suspicions by assuring the opposition that its flexible approach will not create limits on future participation; instead, it is a stepping stone for further degrees of world participation and for more involvement in international organizations.
Another issue that both political camps share is Taiwan's relations, particularly on defense with the United States. Before the U.S. government's Oct. 3 arms sale approval, there had been confusing messages and rumors about the deal. Some officials and think tank scholars had expressed concerns about the KMT administration's determination to defend Taiwan. For instance, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Jim Shinn stated that if Taipei neglected its defense, it would be in danger of letting an unbridgeable chasm open between political ends, strategy and military means.
On the other hand, there has been another group of policy makers and scholars who may be concerned about the uncertainties regarding the U.S. weapons sales to Taipei, but they look at the same issue from different angles. Some argue that Taiwan's military procurement would undermine the new government's efforts in improving cross-strait relations and bringing lasting peace to the region. They therefore call for both sides to confine themselves from taking any step that could be interpreted as a move toward an arms race.
The overall reaction from Washington to Ma's cross-strait policy is one of relief. The U.S. government has been content with the ROC's initial move toward reconciliatory relations with the mainland that is essential for a stable regional order. The Bush administration's decision to unfreeze the arms deal and its continuing support for Taiwan's defense is an encouraging signal to Ma in his efforts to improve cross-strait relations. To assure Washington of Taiwan's determination for defense, Ma has vowed that the KMT government would continue to invest in the country's defense with arms procurements. He stated that "while our minds are focused on working for peace, we cannot believe ignorantly that this is a planet free from war." He also pledged that his administration would strengthen Taiwan's defense capability by setting the gradual increase of the military budget to 3 percent of Taiwan's gross domestic product.
The second challenge is to do with mainland China's response to Taiwan's new approach. While tensions may have been eased recently, it would be over-optimistic and naive to suggest that Beijing will automatically give way to Taipei's legitimate demands, particularly for international participation.
Beijing has long attempted to squeeze the ROC's space internationally not only in the past eight years during the DPP's two terms of office, but actually over the past six decades. The mainland's concerns in dealing with Taiwan's international participation are mainly twofold.
First, any positive gesture toward Taiwan may be interpreted as a sign of weakness and Taiwan may request further concessions from the mainland. The last thing CCP leadership would like to see is that it is perceived as being weak in dealing with external relations and with Taiwan by its domestic political foes. Second, Beijing also worries that if Taiwan is given more space in international organizations, a future DPP government may take advantage of Taiwan's enhanced status to advance its appeal for de jure independence.
However, if the mainland continues its relentless resistance to Taiwan's appeal for international participation, it would only serve to enlarge the gap between the two sides by inviting resentment of the Taiwan people. The ROC's new government has offered an olive branch to Beijing in the first place, but it would be unrealistic to count on Taiwan to act alone in rebuilding mutual trust between the two sides.
Copyright 2008 by Francis Yi-hua Kan
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